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A Problem in Need of Repair: Louisiana's Subsequent
Remedial Measures Rule
I. INTRODUCTION
American legal theory has long rejected the view that "because
the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish
before."' Such a position leads to weak inferences when one
attempts to read fault into the conduct of another. In the area of
evidence of subsequent remedial measures, the weak inference of
guilt forcibly collides with a strong social policy favoring
exclusion. Although Louisiana recognizes the exclusionary rule
when the underlying theory of liability is "negligence or culpable
conduct," 2 we seem to ignore this aspect of conventional wisdom
when the plaintiff is invoking products liability under the
Louisiana Products Liability Act. Instead, the judicial
interpretation of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 407Y allows
the trier of fact to infer fault from the mere act of implementing
post-accident modifications.
Part II of this comment examines the legal history of the
subsequent remedial measures rule, discussing the evolution of
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 and Louisiana Code of Evidence
article 407. Despite the drafters' initial desire to follow the federal
rule,4 the substance of article 407 and the jurisprudential
application of the exclusionary rule remain stagnant as the federal
rule has evolved to reflect changing attitudes toward including
products liability within the scope of the rule. In 1997, Congress
amended Federal Rule of Evidence 407 to expressly include
products liability within the provision's protection, thereby
officially adopting the position of the majority of federal circuits
Copyright 2006, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. FED. R. EviD. 407 advisory committee's note (1997).
2. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 407 (2005).
3. Article 407 provides:
In a civil case, when, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken
previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of
the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct in connection with the event. This Article does not
require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered
for another purpose, such as proving ownership, authority, knowledge,
control, or feasibility or precautionary measures, or for attacking
credibility.
LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 407 (2005).
4. See LA. CODE EvED. ANN. art. 407 cmt. (a) (1988).
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and many states.5 The current position in Louisiana, however,
maintains the antiquated Louisiana Supreme Court interpretation
of article 407 as exclusive of products liability, a pronouncement
proclaimed in the seminal case of Toups v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
6
Part III argues that the time is ripe for Louisiana to revisit and
reevaluate its interpretation of the subsequent remedial measures
rule. Specifically, article 407 needs to be expanded to bar the
admissibility of subsequent remedial measures evidence when the
underlying theory of culpability is products liability.
Jurisprudence discussing this article is sparse and old. The most
recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision to consider the Toups
ruling was announced in 1994.7 The two appellate decisions since
the 1997 federal amendment cite Toups for propositions based on
grounds unrelated to article 407.8
Commentators have repeatedly criticized the Toups decision.9
They chastise the Louisiana Supreme Court for failing to address
the position of the majority of federal circuits at the'time of Toups
and for relying on external authority without providing an
explanation for why such a novel construction of article 407 was
adopted as Louisiana law.' 0 Moreover, they condemn the court for
overstating the conformity of its holding with prior Louisiana
law. "1
Part IV argues that, upon reevaluation of article 407, Louisiana
must embrace the federal position. Allowing the use of subsequent
remedial measures as evidence promotes inferences of guilt with
weak probative value. 12 These legal relevancy concerns reinforce
5. FED. R. EviD. 407 advisory committee's note (1997).
6. 507 So. 2d 809 (La. 1987).
7. See Hines v. Remington Arms Co., 648 So. 2d 331, 334 (La. 1994).
8. See Chauvin v. Sisters of Mercy Health Sys., St. Louis, Inc., 818 So. 2d
833 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 825 So. 2d 1194 (La. 2002); Maher v.
Costa Lines Cargo Serv., Inc., 691 So. 2d 1303 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
695 So. 2d 985 (La. 1997).
9. See, e.g., David M. Bienvenu, Subsequent Remedial Measures and the
Louisiana Code of Evidence: Some Thoughts on Interpretation, 51 LA. L. REV.
1069 (1991); J.M. Garner, Toups v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.: Admissibility of
Subsequent Remedial Measures in Products Liability Cases, 62 TUL. L. REV.
660 (1988); Robert Rene Rabalais, Toups v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co.: Re-
Assessing Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures Evidence in a
Products Liability Suit, 48 LA. L. REv. 985 (1988); Elvige C. Richards,
Admission into Evidence of Postaccident Warnings in Product Liability Suits:
Toups v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 34 LOY. L. REv. 448 (1988).
10. Rabalais, supra note 9, at 997.
11. Garner, supra note 9, at 666.
12. Joseph A. Hoffman & George D. Zuckerman, Tort Reform & Rules of
Evidence: Saving the Rule Excluding Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Actions,
22 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 497, 508 (1987).
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a strong social policy encouraging manufacturers to continue
improving their product, a collision of forces that urges exclusion.
Thus, the exclusionary rule for subsequent remedial measures
should be extended to products liability actions. Jury confusion
presents an additional concern when juries are asked to weigh the
value of a weak inference of fault against the strong social policy
favoring exclusion. Measures enacted after an accident may not be
relevant in proving what a manufacturer knew or should have
known at the time of the injury; however, it is difficult to convey
this reality to a jury assessing liability. Finally, the current
treatment produces different results in Louisiana if litigated in
federal or state court. This inconsistency undoubtedly inspires
defendants to seek removal of the case to federal court in order to
avoid harsh treatment.'
3
Part V concludes that Louisiana must expand article 407 to bar
the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures as evidence in a
products liability case. This solution can be achieved through an
amendment to article 407 or through a new judicial interpretation,
reversing Toups. Regardless of the means chosen for modernizing
the provision, policy and logic dictate that Louisiana must embrace
the federal position, rendering evidence of subsequent remedial
measures inadmissible in products liability cases.
II. BACKGROUND AND LEGAL HISTORY
The drafters of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 407
expressed an initial desire to follow the federal counterpart;'
4
however, the two provisions are drastically different today because
of contrasting treatment of products liability and its place within
the subsequent remedial measures rule. 15  Through the 1997
amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 407, Congress expressly
included products liability within the scope of the rule, an act
codifing the position of the majority of federal circuits at the
time. In contrast, Louisiana maintains its interpretation of article
407 as exclusive of products liability, a position which has
remained stagnant since the Louisiana Supreme Court origzinally
interpreted the provision in Toups v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
13. Bienvenu, supra note 9, at 1082.
14. See LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 407 cmt. (a) (1988).
15. Compare LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art 407 (2005), with FED. R. EviD. 407.
16. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note (1997).
17. 507 So. 2d 809 (La. 1987).
2006]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 407
The exclusion of subsequent remedial measures as evidence is
a fundamental aspect of the law.' 8 Federal Rule of Evidence 407,
which codified the common law rule, precludes the use of
subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence or culpable
conduct. 19  Through its enactment, the rule recognized two
important policy considerations: a concern that evidence of
subsequent remedial measures is logically irrelevant in assessing
liability, and the fear of deterring safety measures.20
Commentators agree that evidence of measures implemented
after an event or injury is "logically irrelevant" in determining
whether an individual breached a duty of care because the
improvements may have been motivated by factors completely
unrelated to negligence. 21 The Rules Committee explained that
such conduct cannot be an admission of fault because that conduct
is equally consistent with an accident or an injury exacerbated by
contributory negligence. 22  Depending on the unique facts and
circumstances of the case, the inferences drawn from subsequent
remedial measures suggesting that the defendant failed to exercise
due care "can vary considerably in probative force. 23
Recognizing that a trier of fact may erroneously infer guilt from
conduct, the Committee added that, when considered in
conjunction with a strong social policy encouraging further safety
measures, evidence of subsequent remedial changes demands
exclusion.24 This legislative balance was premised on the fear that
admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures would thwart
progression toward a safer environment. 25  Simply, the policy of
18. See, e.g., Rabalais, supra note 9, at 986 (explaining that evidence of
subsequent remedial measures has "always [been] inadmissible" in showing
negligent or culpable conduct).
19. Id.
20. FED. R. EvIt 407 advisory committee's note (1972):
The rule rests on two grounds. (1) The conduct is not in fact an
admission, since the conduct is equally consistent with injury by mere
accident or through contributory negligence. Or, as Baron Bramwell
put it, the rule rejects the notion that "because the world gets wiser as it
gets older, therefore it was foolish before ... (2) The other, and more
impressive, ground for exclusion rests on a social policy of encouraging
people to take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in
furtherance of added safety." (citations omitted).
21. Rabalais, supra note 9, at 987.
22. FED. R. EviD. 407 advisory committee's note (1972).
23. Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 2 WEINSTEIN's FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 407.03[2] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2006).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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encouraging individuals to take safety measures outweighed the
possible relevance of a determination of negligence. As a result,
the rule prevents injured plaintiffs from introducing evidence of
subsequent improvements to prove negligence or other conduct
falling into the umbrella category of "culpable conduct."
6
Nevertheless, the applicability of the general subsequent
remedial measures rule to actions predicated on products liability
remained the source of debate long after the enactment of Rule
407. Followin# the landmark case of Ault v. International
Harvester Co.,2 'the relationship between evidence of subsequent
remedial measures and products liability became a heated issue
that divided the federal circuits for decades.2 8  The circuit split
essentially turned on the Ault court's disparate treatment of the
distinctive features separating "negligence or culpable conduct"
and products liability. Ault and its progeny deemed the differences
between "negligence or culpable conduct" and strict products
liability29  insurmountable.30  This distinction rendered it
"manifestly unrealistic" to include a manufacturer within the
policy considerations motivating the exclusionary rule.3' The
court did not envision that a contemporary manufacturer would
forego implementing improvements, risking additional lawsuits
and a negative public image, solely out of fear that evidence of
subsequent remedial measures could be admitted as evidence in a
suit arising from an injury sustained prior to the improvement.32
Thus, the Ault court deemed the exclusionary rule to have little
impact on the conduct of a manufacturer.
33
Proponents of this restrictive theory emphasize the distinction
between negligence and strict products liability, arguing that, while
26. Marcie J. Freeman, Comment, Spanning the Spectrum: Proposed
Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 407, 28 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1175,
1177 (1997).
27. 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974).
28. Bienvenu, supra note 9, at 1074.
29. While many federal decisions talk in terms of "strict products liability,"
as does the Louisiana Supreme Court in Toups, it is important to note that
following the adoption of the Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA"), the
standard in Louisiana is no longer "strict products liability." See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2800.51 (2005). Nevertheless, this discussion is applicable to the
LPLA because under the LPLA the legislature introduced a less blameworthy
system. See Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, LOUISIANA TORT LAW §
15-5 (1996). Thus, if strict products liability fits within the category of
"culpable conduct" as the majority of the federal circuits argue, a fortiori, the
logic is equally relevant to a less-blameworthy theory of liability.
30. Ault, 528 P.2d at 1152.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
2006)
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negligence allocates blame based on the conduct of the -defendant,
strict products liability looks only to the condition of the product
independent of the conduct of the manufacturer.34 According to
this view, society holds the -manufacturer responsible for the
accident or injury regardless of whether his decisions or actions
were reasonable-the standard for determining negligence.
35
Thus, advocates deem exclusion of the evidence of subsequent
remedial measures unnecessary since fault is not an issue.
36
Nevertheless, during this time of uncertainty, the majority of
the federal circuits held Federal Rule of Evidence 407 equally
applicable to products liability and negligence actions.3 7 In fact, at
the time of the 1997 amendment to the rule, the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits stood alone in interpreting Rule 407 as excluding products
liability.
38
In extending Rule 407 to strict liability, Judge Richard Posner
of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals asserted that he was not
persuaded by the "purely semantic argument" advanced by the
Eighth Circuit. 39  He reasoned that the factors motivating an
alleged tortfeasor in his determination as to whether to implement
subsequent remedial measures following an accident were equally
influential to a manufacturer. 40  To Judge Posner, a failure to
34. Randolph L. Bums, Note, Subsequent Remedial Measures and Strict
Products Liability: A New--Relevant----Answer to an Old Problem, 81 VA. L.
REv. 1141, 1151 (1995). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965); W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton & David G. Owen,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 (5th ed. 1984).
35. Bums, supra note 34, at 1152. See also Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying
Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1983) ("Society chooses to place
responsibility... with the manufacturer, regardless of the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's design decisions. In actions against such manufacturers,
therefore, the jury's sole inquiry is on the product.").
36. C. Paul Carver, Subsequent Remedial Measures 2000 and Beyond, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 583, 590 (2000).
37. See, e.g., Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1986); Flaminio
v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v.
Ala. Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983); Joseph v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d
985 (3d Cir. 1982); Hall v. Am. S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982); Cann v.
Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d
848 (4th Cir. 1980).
38. See Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497, 506 (8th Cir. 1993), superseded
by statute, FED. R. EvID. 407, as amended; Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
908 F.2d 1470, 1480-81 (10th Cir. 1990), superseded by statute, FED. R. EviD.
407, as amended; Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d
788, 793 (8th Cir. 1977).
39. Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 469.
40. See, e.g., Bums, supra note 34, at 1154-55 (citing Flaminio, 733 F.2d at
469) ("The analysis is not fundamentally affected by whether the basis of
liability is the defendant's negligence or his product's defectiveness or inherent
200 [Vol. 67
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extend Rule 407 would potentially discourage remedial measures
regardless of whether the theory of culpability was products
liability or negligence. 4' Ultimately, the overwhelming majority of
federal circuits agreed with Judge Posner's argument that the
deterrent effect of admitting evidence of post-injury remedial
measures existed under either theory.42  Thus, these circuits
deemed an extension of the rule to be justified.
Proponents of the majority position analogized the allocation of
blame in a strict products liability case to that in a negligence
action.43 This argument admits that the focus in strict products
liability is on a defect in the product and not on fault. This
difference, however, does not justify inclusion of evidence of
subsequent remedial measures, as such evidence thwarts the
societal goal of promotinj safety. Furthermore, it is often subject
to abuse when admitted. The Fourth Circuit further reasoned that
in a failure to warn case, the differences between the theories of
negligence and products liability become especially insignificant,
as both fundamentally revolve around the issue of whether the
warning was adequate.
45
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the
relevancy issue in Grenada Steel Industries v. Alabama Oxygen
Co.46 Judge Alvin Rubin acknowledged that judges and lawyers
cannot ascertain the precise reason why a change was made in a
product.47 The relevant question in assessing liability is whether
dangerousness. In either case, if evidence of subsequent remedial measures is
admissible.., the incentive to take such measures will be reduced.").
41. Id.
42. Id. See, e.g., Gauthier, 788 F.2d at 637; Cann, 658 F.2d at 60; Werner,
628 F.2d at 857.
43. Bums, supra note 34, at 1155.
44. Carver, supra note 36, at 591.
45. Werner, 628 F.2d at 858. This sentiment is equally true in Louisiana
where liability for an inadequate warning requires scienter, rendering this theory
of products liability similar to negligence. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2800.53(9) (2005); id. § 9:2800.57; id. § 9:2800.59(B); John Kennedy, A
Primer on the Louisiana Products Liability Act, 49 LA. L. REv. 565, 614, 620
(1989). Analogous to the negligence standard, the LPLA holds a manufacturer
responsible for risks of which he knew or should have known at the time of
distribution. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.57 (2005).
46. 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983).
47. Id. at 888. The court went on to state:
It seems to us, with no greater expertise than like-trained lawyers and
judges, that changes in design or in manufacturing process might be
made after an accident for a number of different reasons . . . . We
cannot really know why changes are made by industry generally or why
a change was made in a particular product in the absence of evidence
2006]
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the product or design was defective when it left the manufacturer's
control, regardless of motive or knowledge.48 Thus, evidence of
subsequent remedial measures has little relevance in determining
whether the product was defective at an earlier time and therefore
should be excluded in products liability.
49
The 1997 amendment to Rule 407 resolved the debate, as
Congress unequivocally clarified its position on the applicability of
the subsequent remedial measures rule to products liability cases.
50
Pursuant to the amended rule, evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is inadmissible to establish "a defect in a product, a
defect in a product's design, or a need for warning or
instruction. ' ' 51 The Advisory Committee's Note explicitly states
that these additional areas were included to officially adopt the
position advanced by the majority of the federal circuits. 52
B. Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 407
In Louisiana, evidence of subsequent remedial measures is
inadmissible to prove "negligence or culpable conduct."53 Such
evidence, however, is admissible to prove "ownership, authority,
knowledge, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures., 54 In
on the question. Instead, we ought to consider the probative value of
such evidence on the point at issue.
Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 887.
50. The amended rule clarifies:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures
are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm
less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product,
a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership,
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment.
FED. R. EvID. 407.
51. Id.
52. FED. R. EviD. 407 advisory committee's note (1997) ("This amendment
adopts the view of a majority of the circuits that have interpreted Rule 407 to
apply to products liability actions.").
53. LA. CODE EvlD. ANN. art. 407 (2005).
54. Id. The comments to the article do not explain the second sentence of
article 407, other than the blanket statement that "[t]his Article generally follows
Federal Rule of Evidence 407." LA. CODE EviD. ANN. art. 407 cmt. (a) (1988).
The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 407 provides insight into the purpose
of these exceptions:
[Vol. 67
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addition to deleting the "if controverted" requirement found in
Federal Rule of Evidence 407," Louisiana's Code of Evidence is
silent on the issue of products liability, leaving the crucial decision
of applicability to judicial interpretation. 56
The Louisiana Supreme Court cemented Louisiana's
interpretation of article 407 as exclusive of products liability
actions in Toups.57  In this products liability suit against the
manufacturer of an allegedly defective water heater, the court
analyzed whether the subsequent addition of warnings to an
owner's manual and water heater were admissible as evidence.
The Toups court recognized the general rule that measures enacted
after an accident or injury are inadmissible as evidence of
negligent conduct---a rule inspired by the long-accepted social
policy that encourages individuals to implement adequate
measures to thwart future harm.
58
The court held that the general rule excluding evidence of
remedial modifications did not include actions predicated on
products liability when the underlying issue was "credibility and
precautionary measures," such as the existence of an alternative
The second sentence of the rule directs attention to the limitations of
the rule. Exclusion is called for only when the evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is offered as proof of negligence or culpable
conduct. In effect it rejects the suggested inference that fault is
admitted. Other purposes are, however, allowable, including
ownership or control, existence of duty, and feasibility of precautionary
measures, if controverted, and impeachment.
FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (1972). These exceptions to
article 407, however, are not the focus of this comment.
55. In Louisiana, the exception to the general rule need not be controverted,
which is an absence that deviates from the federal standard and common law.
Bienvenu, supra note 9, at 1083. This omission, however, presents a danger that
the exceptions will swallow the rule, primarily the knowledge exception.
Knowledge is a fundamental aspect of negligence; thus, knowledge will always
be an issue, and article 407 will not apply to many negligence cases. Id.
56. The comments further explain:
If the substantive law underlying the case is based on some concept of
negligence or culpable conduct, this Article applies. But if the
substantive law is based on any other theory, this Article is inapplicable
.... The elusiveness of the distinction is illustrated by the strict and
product liability cases. This Article does not attempt specifically to
address or resolve these issues.
LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art 407 cmt. (b) (1988) (emphasis added).
57. 507 So. 2d 809, 818 (La. 1987).
58. Id. at 816. See, e.g., Givens v. DeSoto Bldg. Co., 100 So. 534 (La.
1924); Galloway v. Employers Mut. of Wausau, 286 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 290 So. 2d 333 (La. 1974); Currier v. Saenger Theaters Corp.,
10 So. 2d 526 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942).
2006] 203
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design or a warning. 59  The court acknowledged that three
Louisiana courts previously excluded post-accident evidence that a
product was defective. 60  Nevertheless, citing Fontenot v. F.
Hollier & Sons,6 1 the court asserted that evidence of such changes
was admissible if the underlying issue was failure to warn.62 The
court unilaterally avowed that the policy considerations that
motivated the exclusion of evidence of remedial measures were
irrelevant when the underlying theory was strict liability.63 As
justification, the court cited three federal Eighth Circuit decisions
and a California Supreme Court decision, all of which held that the
policy factors compelling exclusion of evidence of remedial
measures did not pertain to cases involving strict liability.
64
Relying on these outside courts' assessments of policy
considerations, the Louisiana Supreme Court asserted that
evidence of subsequent remedial measures should be admitted.
Although article 407 had not been enacted at the time of the
decision, the court proclaimed that this interpretation was
consistent with the Proposed Code of Evidence and prior Louisiana
jurisprudence. 65 The court justified its position by alleging that
any possible deterrent effect resulting from the decision would be
mitigated by the affirmative defense of scientific unknowability
available to a manufacturer in failure to warn, alternative design,
and alternative product cases. 66 The court felt that this defense
59. Toups, 507 So. 2d at 818.
60. Id.
61. 478 So. 2d 1379 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985), affd sub nom, Lafleur v. John
Deere Co., 491 So. 2d 624 (La. 1986).
62. Toups, 507 So. 2d at 818. See sources cited supra note 45 for a
discussion of the current standard for culpability predicated on a failure to warn
under the LPLA.
63. Toups, 507 So. 2d at 818.
64. Id. See Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1980); Farner
v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977); Robbins v. Farmer's Union Grain
Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977); Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528
P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974).
65. Toups, 507 So. 2d at 818.
66. Id. at 817 (citing Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d
110, 118 (La. 1986), superseded by statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.51
(1988)). The State of the Art defense is an affirmative defense provided by the
LPLA, explained in Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:2800.59:
Notwithstanding R.S. 9:2800.56, a manufacturer of a product shall not
be liable for damage proximately caused by a characteristic of the
product's design if the manufacturer proves that, at the time the product
left his control:
He did not know and, in light of then-existing reasonably available
scientific and technological knowledge, could not have known of the
design characteristic that caused the damage or the danger of such
characteristic; or
[Vol. 67
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would combat the possible deterrent effects resulting from its
refusal to extend the subsequent remedial measures rule to
products liability cases.67
Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court compensated for the
legislative silence in article 407 by holding that the subsequent
remedial measures rule is inapplicable when the underlying theory
of culpability is strict products liability. Although critics have
condemned Toups since its announcement, 68 the decision has not
been disturbed by subsequent jurisprudence, despite evolving
trends at the federal level and changes in Louisiana products
liability law.
C. The Current State of the Louisiana Products Liability Act
The legislature enacted the Louisiana Products Liability Act
("LPLA") in 1988 to create the exclusive theories of liability for
manufacturers when a product causes damage. 69 Consequently, a
claimant cannot bring an action against a manufacturer for damage
caused by a product under any theory of liability not included
under the Act.7° The manufacturer is liable for damage caused by
an "unreasonably dangerous" characteristic of the product if the
damage arose from a "reasonably anticipated use," and this
characteristic either existed at the time the product left the
manufacturer's control or resulted from a "reasonably anticipated
He did not know and, in light of then-existing reasonably available
scientific and technological knowledge, could not have known of the
alternative design identified by the claimant under R.S. 9:2800.56(1);
or
The alternative design identified by the claimant under § 9:2800.56(1)
was not feasible, in light of then-existing economic particularity.
Notwithstanding R.S. 9:2800.57(A) or (B), a manufacturer of a product
shall not be liable for damage proximately caused by a characteristic of
the product if the manufacturer proves that, at the time the product left
his control, he did not know and, in light of then-existing reasonably
available scientific and technological knowledge, could not have
known of the characteristic that caused the damage or the danger of
such characteristic.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.59 (2005).
67. Rabalais, supra note 9, at 1002. Commentators criticize the Toups
court's use of the affirmative defense as a justification for admitting evidence of
subsequent remedial measures. See, e.g., id
68. See sources cited supra note 9.
69. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.52 (2005).
70. Id.
2006]
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alteration or modification of the product.",71 The legislature further
explicated the four ways a product may be considered
unreasonably danqerous: unreasonably dangerous in construction
or composition, unreasonably dangerous in design,
73
unreasonably dangerous due to the manufacturer's failure to
provide an adequate warning,74 and the failure to conform to an
express warranty about the product.
75
In expressly establishing the exclusive theories for liability
against a manufacturer in a products liability action, the LPLA
effectively deleted the general negligence claim against a
manufacturer. 7  Nevertheless, aspects of negligence and strict
liability survived and are evident through the theories of liability
sanctioned by the LPLA.77
III. ANALYSIS: THE TIME IS RIPE FOR REEVALUATION OF
LOUISIANA'S INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 407
Louisiana Code of Evidence article 407 demands reevaluation.
Writers have advanced numerous criticisms and condemnations of
the article itself, as well as attacks on the jurisprudential
interpretation of the provision.78 Louisiana should modernize its
position to include products liability within, the scope of the
subsequent remedial measures rule. Times have changed since its
enactment and interpretation, as evidenced by the amendment to
the federal rule to provide for products liability.
A. The Substance ofArticle 407 Is Silent As to Its Application to
Products Liability
Article 407 is silent as to its applicability to products liability
cases. The comments to the article state that "[p]rior Louisiana
law was generally in accord with this article," pointing the reader
71. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 29, at § 15-4 (citing LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2800.54 (2005)).
72. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.55 (2005).
73. Id. § 9:2800.56.
74. Id. § 9:2800.57.
75. Id. § 9:2800.58.
76. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 29, at § 15-4. The authors note that
"[b]ecause the LPLA makes these the only theories of recovery available against
a manufacturer for damages caused by its products, the two obvious casualties
of the LPLA are the general negligence action against the manufacturer and
Halphen's unreasonably dangerous per se theory." Id.
77. Id.; Kennedy, supra note 45, at 589-90.
78. See sources cited supra note 9.
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to four cases.79 These cases, however, do not support the statement
that admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures in
products liability actions is supported by Louisiana law.80 While
establishing that such evidence is inadmissible to prove negligence
or culpable conduct, the cited cases do not discuss whether
subsequent remedial measures are admissible as evidence on other
occasions.8'
Two of these cases, Givens v. DeSoto Building Co.8 2 and
Currier v. Saenger Theaters Corp.,8 3 simply articulate the general
rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures.
84
Moreover, a close reading of Gauche v. Ford Motor Co.85 and
Galloway v. Employers Mutual,8 6 also referenced in the comments
to article 407, suggests a contrary application of the rule. 7
Although admissibility in products liability was not addressed
specifically by the Louisiana Fourth Circuit in these decisions, if
decided today, they would be grounded in products liability. 8 The
cases cited in the comments to article 407 reflect prior Louisiana
law as it pertains to negligence. Consequently, these decisions
cannot be relied upon as authority for carving out an exception to
the general exclusionary rule for products liability.
B. Problems with the Jurisprudential Interpretation ofArticle 407:
Toups v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
Since it was announced, doctrinal writers have condemned the
Toups decision and have presented numerous reasons to undermine
its authority.8 9 Critics have repeatedly questioned the Louisiana
Supreme Court's injection of the federal minority position on this
issue into Louisiana law.
90
79. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 407 cmt. (a) (1988) (citing Givens v. DeSoto
Bldg. Co., 100 So. 534 (La. 1924); Galloway v. Employers Mut. of Wausau, 286
So. 2d 676 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 290 So. 2d 333 (La. 1974); Gauche
v. Ford Motor Co., 226 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Currier v. Saenger
Theaters Corp., 10 So. 2d 526 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942)).
80. Rabalais, supra note 9, at 997.
81. Id.
82. 100 So. 534 (La. 1924).
83. 10 So. 2d 526 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942).
84. Richards, supra note 9, at 451.
85. 226 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
86. 286 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 290 So. 2d 333 (La.
1974).
87. Rabalais, supra note 9, at 997 n.71.
88. Id.
89. See sources cited supra note 9.
90. Garner, supra note 9, at 667.
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Specifically, the Louisiana Supreme Court relied on external
authority to corroborate its interpretation of the subsequent
remedial measures rule, but the position adopted by the court
followed the minority view, supported at that time only by the
federal Eighth and Tenth Circuits. 9' Moreover, the court failed to
mention contrary intewretations of Louisiana's model-Federal
Rule of Evidence 407. The court's analysis completely ignored
the dominant federal attitude at the time, which included strict and
products liability cases within the subsequent remedial measures
rules. 93 In fact, the court failed to acknowledge the existence of a
contrary position at all.94 Without offering an explanation or
justification, the court declared evidence of subsequent remedial
measures admissible in strict products liability actions.95
The Louisiana Supreme Court's declaration that admitting this
evidence in products liability cases was consistent with prior
Louisiana jurisprudence further discredits the decision. Instead,
the court failed to accurately follow the precedent established by
prior decisions.
The court began its discussion by correctly asserting that
Louisiana embraces the exclusionary rule in negligence actions,
acknowledging the possible deterrent effects of allowing evidence
of remedial measures. 96 The Louisiana Supreme Court officially
adopted this general rule in Givens v. De Soto Building Co.97 As
justification, the Givens court asserted that allowing evidence of
subsequent remedial measures would effectively serve as a penalty
against the accused,98 rendering the individual less motivated to
implement remedial changes because he fears legal repercussions.
Thus, admitting post-accident modifications as evidence of liability
prevents society from modernizing with changes in technology and
91. See, e.g., Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1331
(10th Cir. 1983); Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1980).
92. Garner, supra note 9, at 666.
93. Id.
94. See Toups v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 507 So. 2d 809, 816 (La. 1987)
("The policy considerations which exclude evidence of remedial measures in
negligence cases are not applicable where strict liability is involved."). Without
an explanation, the court simply cited three Eighth Circuit cases and a California
Supreme Court case that recognized the minority position at the time of Toups.
See Unterburger, 630 F.2d 599; Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir.
1977); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir.
1977); Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974).
95. Toups, 507 So. 2d at 816.
96. Id.
97. 100 So. 534, 535 (La. 1924).
98. Id. ("[I]f the evidence is competent, it operates as a confession that he
was guilty of prior wrong.").
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learning from experience. 99 The Givens rule was reinforced in
Currier v. Saenger Theaters Corp., a case in which the Louisiana
First Circuit held that the repair of a carpet following an injury was
"without probative value to show negligence," concluding that "by
the decided weight of authority, the proof of such a fact is
irrelevant and inadmissible."' 00 Additionally, Louisiana courts
held evidence of a recall irrelevant in establishing negligence.'10
The Toups decision invited criticism by removing products
liability and strict liability from the general rule.102 At the time of
Toups, Louisiana jurisprudence had not created an exception for
strict liability. 10 3 Not only had Louisiana courts failed to carve out
an exception for strict products liability from the subsequent
remedial measures rule, but the highest court in Louisiana had
never before addressed the issue. On the contrary, the court
uniformly denied writs when confronted with the question of
admissibility in products liability suits.'04
Although lower courts included products liability within the
general rule, these decisions were not mentioned in Toups. In
Lovell v. Earl Grissmer Co., the Louisiana First Circuit held that
evidence of a post-accident change offered by the plaintiff in an
effort to prove a product defect was not logically or legally
relevant.' °5 The first circuit reasoned that the change simply may
have been motivated by a desire to make the product "totally
innocuous," though it previously presented no unreasonable risk of
harm. 10 6  Ultimately, the first circuit regarded the subsequent
remedial measures rule and its rationale as equally applicable both
to manufacturers and negligent tortfeasors.
107
Other lower court decisions similarly included products
liability actions within the scope of the subsequent remedial
measures rule. In Smith v. Formica Corp., the first circuit deemed
post-accident federal regulatory changes to a warning label
irrelevant in proving that a defect existed at the time of injury.' °8In declaring post-accident changes inadmissible in a failure to
99. Rabalais, supra note 9, at 993.
100. Currier v. Saenger Theaters Corp., 10 So. 2d 526, 527 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1942).
101. See, e.g., Gauche v. Ford Motor Co., 226 So. 2d 198, 211 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1969).
102. Toups v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 507 So. 2d 809, 816 (La. 1987).
103. Bienvenu, supra note 9, at 1081.
104. Rabalais, supra note 9, at 994 n.51.
105. 422 So. 2d 1344, 1349 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d
871 (La. 1983).
106. Id.
107. Richards, supra note 9, at 453.
108. 439 So. 2d 1194, 1200 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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warn case, the Louisiana Third Circuit added, "[I]t is apparent...
that Louisiana courts are not completely convinced that a products
liability exception should be created.'" 9
Without acknowledging any of these cases, the Toups court
cited Fontenot for the proposition that "on the issue of failure to
warn, such evidence has been admitted."' 10 Ironically, the Toups
court did not discuss the case or its rationale.' In reality, the
authority cited by the Louisiana Supreme Court is hollow because
the case proffered a narrow holding that is easily distinguishable
from Toups.
In Fontenot, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that evidence
of post-accident changes is generally inadmissible." 2
Nevertheless, "under the facts of this case," admission was proper,
for the measures were not deemed post-injury modifications but
evidence necessary to illustrate pre-injury changes." 3  The
admissibility of subsequent remedial measures as evidence of
liability, therefore, was not an issue before the court in Fontenot.114
Since the holding is distinguishable, the strength of its authority is
weakened considerably. As a result, the Toups decision
represented a break from prior Louisiana jurisprudence, which had
not excluded products liability from the general rule since its
formal adoption in Givens.115
As an additional criticism, one writer condemned the court's
reliance on the Proposed Louisiana Code of Evidence as a
justification for reversing prior jurisprudence." 6 As it had not
been adopted at the time of the decision, proposed article 407 was
not the law in Louisiana at the time. 1 7 The court incorrectly cited
Fontenot to support its argument that the article reflected
Louisiana law. In so holding, the court officially sanctioned a
proposed article which would change Louisiana's evidentiary
standards in products liability without adequately explaining its
reasoning. 18 Furthermore, the proposed article alone does notjustify the court's holding with regards to products liability
109. Mobley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 482 So. 2d 1056 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 486 So. 2d 735 (La. 1986).
110. Toups v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 507 So. 2d 809, 816 (La. 1987).
111. Richards, supra note 9, at 458.
112. Fontenot v. F. Hollier & Sons, 478 So. 2d 1379, 1388 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1985), aff'dsub nom, Lafleur v. John Deere Co., 491 So. 2d 624 (La. 1986).
113. Id.
114. Rabalais, supra note 9, at 1000.
115. Richards, supra note 9, at 459.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 460.
118. Id.
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because it solely discusses "negligence or culpable conduct," never
mentioning strict or products liability." 
9
C. Times are Changing-Louisiana Should Follow the Federal
Trend in Excluding Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures in
Products Liability Cases
In addition to the numerous problems arising from the Toups
court's interpretation of article 407, changes in the federal
treatment of the subsequent remedial measures rule necessitate
reevaluation of Louisiana's position. In 1997, Congress amended
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 to provide an explicit answer to the
question of whether the rule applies to products liability, thereby
officially resolving the dispute among the federal circuits. In
addition to evidence of subsequent remedial measures being
inadmissible to prove negligence or "culpable conduct," Congress
added that such evidence is barred when establishing "a defect in a
product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or
instruction.v 2 0 The Advisory Committee's Note acknowledges the
importance of this amendment, explaining that Congress "adopts
the view of a majority of the circuits that have interpreted Rule 407
to apply to products liability actions.' 21 Furthermore, at the time
of the proposal, many states paralleled federal jurisprudence,
similarly construing their respective rules to exclude evidence in
negligence and strict liability actions.122 An analysis of trends inthe various states reveals that states are amending their respective
119. Id. at 462.
120. FED. R. EvID. 407.
121. FED. R. Ev1D. 407 advisory committee's note (1997) (citing Joint E.
Dist. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 995 F.2d 343
(2d Cir. 1993); Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1275 (3d Cir. 1992);
Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1522 (1st Cir. 1991); Gauthier v.
AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 636-37 (9th Cir. 1986); Flaminio v. Honda Motor
Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Ala.
Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d
54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981); Werner v. Upjohn Inc., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980);
Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 232 (6th Cir.
1980)).
122. See, e.g., First Premier Bank v. Kolkraft Enters., 686 N.W.2d 430, 451
(S.D. 2004); Hyjek v. Anthony Indus., 944 P.2d 1036, 1039, 1042-43 (Wash.
1997); Cyr v. J.I. Case Co., 652 A.2d 685, 693 (N.H. 1994); Krause v. Am.
Aerolights, Inc., 762 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Or. 1988); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407
N.W.2d 92, 97-98 (Minn. 1987); Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 202
(Mont. 1986); Hallmark v. Allied Prod. Corp., 646 P.2d 319, 325-26 (Ariz.
1982).
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subsequent remedial measures rules to provide for exclusion in
products liability cases.
1 23
The comments to Louisiana Code of Evidence article 407
proclaim that the article "generally follows" the federal rule.
124
The Louisiana Supreme Court reiterated this statement, pointing to
the nearly identical language in the federal rule and the proposed
Louisiana article. 12s However, despite the initial desire to follow
the federal rule, Louisiana has not similarly amended its article to
provide for products liability, nor have the courts altered their
interpretation to extend article 407 to products liability actions.
Prior to the federal amendment, the Louisiana Supreme Court
discussed the Toups decision in Northern Assurance Co. v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co. 126 In analyzing whether the plaintiff
could introduce photographic evidence taken after an injury, the
court credited Toups for establishing that evidence of subsequent
remedial measures was admissible in a products liability action to
determine what the manufacturer knew or should have known. 1
27
In Shaw v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co., the second
circuit explained that article 407 only applied to a cause of action
predicated on a theory of negligence or culpable conduct. 128 Citing
Toups, the court maintained that in a strict products liability action,
evidence of subsequent remedial measures was crucial to
determine what the manufacturer knew or should have known.
12 9
Subsequent appellate decisions similarly relied on Toups as
authority for this restrictive interpretation of article 407.130
The most recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision mentioning
Toups was announced in 1994, prior to the federal amendment to
Rule 407.'1' The only appellate decisions citing Toups since the
amendment cited the case on other grounds. The Louisiana Fourth
123. See, e.g., Carver, supra note 36, at 590; Thomas S. Stewart & Stacy M.
Andreas, Subsequent Remedial Measures: An Analytical Model for Product
Liability Cases, 26 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 74 app. 11 (1990).
124. LA. CODE EViD. ANN. art. 407 cmt. (a) (1988).
125. See N. Assurance Co. v. La. Power & Light Co., 580 So. 2d 351, 357
n.6 (La. 1991) (discussing the policy implications cited in Rule 407) ("The
Louisiana Code of Evidence . . . uses almost identical language pertaining to
evidence of subsequent remedial measures. The comment to the Code states
that prior Louisiana law was generally in accord with this article.").
126. Id. at 357.
127. Id. (citing Toups v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 507 So. 2d 809, 816-17 (La.
1987)).
128. 582 So. 2d 919, 924 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Rivnor Prop. v. Herbert O'Donnell, Inc., 633 So. 2d 735, 745
(La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 643 So. 2d 147 (La. 1994).
131. See Hines v. Remington Arms Co., 648 So. 2d 331, 341 (La. 1994).
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Circuit declined to extend Toups and distinguished the case, but
this negative history arose on grounds other than the treatment of
article 407.132 The only appellate decisions that cited Toups since
the federal amendment are negligible to this analysis because one
referenced the case on other grounds' 33 and the other made no
mention of products liability.'13 " Therefore, it is possible to assume
that the Louisiana Supreme Court will alter its application of
article 407 if presented with the issue after the federal amendment.
IV. LOUISIANA SHOULD ADOPT THE FEDERAL POSITION
Upon reevaluation of article 407, the Louisiana Legislature
must adopt the federal position. The current provision, which
allows the use of subsequent remedial measures as evidence,
encouraes prejudicial inferences of guilt with weak probative
value. 13  In this area, a strong social policy encouraging
progression toward a safer environment collides with these weak
inferences of guilt to mandate exclusion of evidence.1 36  In
addition to being logically and legally irrelevant-to a determination
of fault, 137 the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures tends to confuse jurors assessing liability'38 and to
promote forum shopping.' 3
9
A. Reliance on the 401/403 Balance is Unnecessary and Contrary
to Legislative Intent
Code of Evidence articles 401 and 403 serve as the
"cornerstone" of the Code and the "foundation" that supports the
other provisions. 14  Article 401 defines "relevant evidence,"' 14
1
132. See Chauvin v. Sisters of Mercy Hosp. Sys., St. Louis, Inc., 818 So. 2d
833 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 825 So. 2d 1194 (La. 2002); Maher v.
Costa Lines Cargo Serv., Inc., 691 So. 2d 1303 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
695 So. 2d 985 (La. 1997).
133. See Hesse v. Champs Serv. Line, 758 So. 2d 245, 249 (La. App. 3d Cir.
2000).
134. Conques v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 779 So. 2d 1094 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 790 So. 2d 643 (La. 2001).
135. Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra note 12, at 508.
136. FED. R. EvID 407 advisory committee's note (1972).
137. See Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra note 12, at 508.
138. Matthew L. Kimball, The Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial
Measures in Strict Liability Actions: Some Suggestions Regarding Federal Rule
of Evidence 407, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1415, 1419 (1982).
139. Bienvenu, supra note 9, at 1082.
140. Gerard A. Rault, An Overview of the New Louisiana Code of Evidence-
Its Imperfections and Uncertainties, 49 LA. L. REV. 697, 704 (1989).
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while article 403 presents a balancing test to determine whether the
disputed evidence should be excluded. 142  Under this test,
"relevant" evidence may be excluded if certain enumerated
dangers substantially outweigh its probative worth, specifically the
dangers of "unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury.' ' 43
The comments to article 403 explain that the "401/403
balance" is used only if the issue is not expressly provided for in
articles 404 through 413.'44 Consequently, the existence of article
407 renders evidence of subsequent remedial measures outside the
parameters of the balance. 145 The per se exclusion of subsequent
remedial measures as evidence is not surprising; such evidence
generally is considered unreliable and condemned as "unfairly
prejudicial" with "little probative value.' 46  Therefore, through
article 407, the Louisiana Legislature has already spoken on the
relevance of evidence of subsequent remedial measures.
In Louisiana's Code of Evidence, the legislature did not
explain whether products liability fell within the scope of article
407. Arguably, the legislature's balance is applicable to all
attempts to introduce evidence of subsequent remedial measures as
evidence of fault. Moreover, relying on the 401/403 balancing test
is not an adequate solution to fill the void left by the legislative
silence in the article. One writer argues that exclusion of evidence
of subsequent remedial measures should be categorical, rather than
performed on a case-by-case basis when the time of determining
141. "'Relevant Evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." LA.
CODE EviD. ANN. art. 401 (2005).
142. LA. CODE Evw. ANN. art. 403 (2005). See also Frank L. Mariast,
EVIDENCE & PROOF § 5.1, in 19 LoUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 65-66 (1999);
Rault, supra note 140, at 705.
143. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 403 (2005).
144. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 403 cmt. (b) (1988).
145. Michael W. Blanton, Application of the Federal Rule of Evidence 407 in
Strict Products Liability Cases: The Evidence Weighs Against Automatic
Exclusion, 65 UMKC L. REV. 49, 60 (1996) ("Because subsequent remedial
measures evidence would generally meet the liberal relevance standard of Rule
401, despite its weak probative value in proving negligence, Rule 407 can be
viewed as bypassing the general relevancy determination made under Rule 403
and automatically excluding minimally relevant evidence."). This argument can
be extended to Louisiana Code of Evidence articles 401 and 403, as the
comments to both clarify that they are "based on" and "generally follow"
Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, respectively. See LA. CODE EvID. ANN.
art. 401 cmt. (a) (1988), and LA. CODE EViD. ANN. art. 403 cmt. (a) (1988).
146. Weinstein & Berger, supra note 23, at § 407.03[2].
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liability is the time of distribution, 147 as it is in Louisiana under the
LPLA. Another scholar cites the need for predictability as a strong
reason supporting exclusion of subsequent remedial measures
evidence. 1
The dangers of "confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury,"'149 which prompted the legislature to categorically exclude
evidence of subsequent remedial measures from the 401/403
inquiry, prejudice the defendant, regardless of whether the
subsequent reIair evidence is being used in a negligence or product
liability case. Louisiana cannot rely upon judges to exclude
evidence of subsequent remedial measures utilizing the balance
alone because judges tend to favor admitting evidence when
confronted with questions of relevance and unfair prejudice. 15 1
Thus, in addition to being superseded by legislative fiat through
article 407, relying on the 401/403 balance to determine
admissibility is insufficient in effectively excluding evidence that
warrants exclusion.
B. The Collision of a Strong Social Policy and Weak Inferences of
Guilt Mandates Exclusion of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial
Measures
Congress affirmatively declared in the Advisory Committee's
Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 407 that conduct is not an
admission of fault.' 5 2 Because such conduct is equally consistent
with injury by accident or through contributory fault, remedial acts
taken after an accident have little probative worth as evidence, and
the inferences associated with such evidence may be strong or
weak depending upon the circumstances. 153  Regardless of the
relative weakness of such inferences, the Advisory Committee
deemed the social policy of encouraging additional safety
measures to be the "more impressive" grounds for exclusion.
' 4
The Louisiana Legislature cited identical policy concerns in
enacting the Louisiana Code of Evidence.'
55
147. Bums, supra note 34, at 1171.
148. Bienvenu, supra note 9, at 1082.
149. LA. CODE EviD. ANN. art. 403 (2005).
150. Bums, supra note 34, at 1171.
151. Kimball, supra note 138, at 1434.
152. FED. R. EviD 407 advisory committee's note (1972).
153. Id. See also Maraist, supra note 142, at § 5.3, at 77-78.
154. FED. R. EviD 407 advisory committee's note (1972).
155. 1988 La. Sess. Law Serv. 515 (West). The comments to article 407
state in pertinent part:
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1. Relevancy
The current position of article 407 encourages the trier of fact to
make "inferences upon inferences," a practice that undermines the
probative value of the evidence. While drawing inferences from
evidence is a reality, the fewer inferences drawn to reach a
conclusion, the greater the probative worth of the evidence.' 56 Using
changes implemented after an accident or injury as evidence of fault
requires sequential inferences, which are typically weak inferences of
the manufacturer's negligence or the product's defectiveness.
57
Realistically, numerous motives potentially could have inspired the
particular repair. Thus, admitting evidence of the change encourages
the trier of fact to infer the existence of negligence or a defect,
although neither condition can be established convincingly from this
circumstantial evidence.1
58
a. Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures Is "Logically and
Legally Irrelevant" in Establishing Fault in Products Liability
Evidence of post-accident repairs and changes are "at best,
ambiguous and should be excluded."' 159 Exclusion is predicated on
the understanding that a jury generally construes the act as an
admission, when in reality it is not.10 Admitting evidence of
subsequent remedial measures encourages the inference that "[i]f the
product wasn't broke, why did [d]efendant fix it?' 61  In addition,
parties erroneously infer antecedent negligence from the evidence,
claiming that the subsequent installation of these measures indicates
The major policy ground for this exclusion is the goal of encouraging
people to take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in
furtherance of added safety .... A second policy reason is that the fact
of the subsequent repair or improvement is often ambiguous, and raises
inferences unrelated to the negligence issue as strong as or stronger
than the inference of consciousness of negligence .... Thus, many
improvements simply reflect developing technology or are initiated for
economic reasons.
LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 407 cmt. (c) (1988).
156. See Bums, supra note 34, at 1165.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra note 12, at 508.
160. Id.
161. John M. Kobayashi, Subsequent Remedial Measures and Recall Letters
and Notices, 379 PLI/LiT 503, 575 (1989).
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changes the defendant "should have" implemented before the
accident or injury.162
Scholars argue that "[i]t is the rare manufacturer that isn't
constantly changing and improving its product or the consumer's
understanding of it"; therefore, standing alone, the modification does
not reveal substantial insight about the conduct or product at the time
of the accident.' 63 The Practicing Law Institute cautions: "These
inferences overlook a variety of critical distinctions including the
situations where a product was not defective but could have been
made better, or where new technology or abundance of caution
prompted the subsequent remedial measure., 164 Consequently, the
use of the subsequent remedial measures as evidence is "always
prejudicial and rarely probative."'' 65
b. Including Products Liability Within the Scope ofArticle 407 Is
Consistent with the Louisiana Products Liability Act
Holding evidence of subsequent remedial measures inadmissible
in products liability suits is consistent with the current state of the
LPLA. Scholars agree that the LPLA straddles the theories of
negligence and strict liability.' 66  Consequently, the expansion of
article 407 to provide for products liability does not necessitate an
amendment to Louisiana's Code of Evidence. Such an interpretation
is consistent with the legislative intent to bar the use of remedial
measures as evidence of "negligence and culpable conduct."
While the comments to article 407 reinforce the limitation of the
rule to cases grounded in negligence and culpable conduct, the
legislature did not define these categories or expressly exclude
products liability from falling within either category. 67 The LPLA
explicitly states that "[c]onduct or circumstances that result in liability
under this Chapter are 'fault' within the meaning of Louisiana Civil
Code article 2315. ' 'I6s Thus, an action under the LPLA is analogous
to an ordinary tort under article 2315.169 Violating the legal duty
162. Id.
163. Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra note 12, at 508.
164. Kobayashi, supra note 161, at 575.
165. Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra note 12, at 508.
166. See, e.g., Bienvenu, supra note 9, at 1079; Kennedy, supra note 45, at
589-90.
167. Bienvenu, supra note 9, at 1077 (discussing LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art.
407 cmt. (b) (1988)).
168. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.52 (2005); Bienvenu, supra note 9, at
1078.
169. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2005) ("Every act whatever of man
that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair
it.").
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imposed by the Act constitutes "fault" under Louisiana tort doctrine,
enabling fault under the LPLA to be classified as "culpable
conduct."'170 A further indication that LPLA liability falls within
"culpable conduct" is the fact that victim fault may be offered as a
defense in negligence and also in cases falling under the LPLA. This
similarity creates additional ambiguities in attempting to distinguish
between theories of liability for the purposes of exclusion.171
One observer argues that the relevancy of subsequent remedial
measures evidence in a given jurisdiction turns on the time designated
by substantive law for determining liability.' 72 Under the LPLA, the
manufacturer is liable for damafes caused by the product "at the time
the product left his control."' 7  Therefore, only evidence revealing
qualities of the product up to and including the time in which it left
the manufacturer's control is relevant in assessing liability.
1 74
Admitting evidence of subsequent remedial actions, deemed
irrelevant by the substantive law creating liability, threatens to expand
the scope of liability by essentially holding the manufacturer
responsible for knowledge declared irrelevant through the adoption of
the LPLA. 1
75
c. Admitting Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures
Promotes Inferences of Guilt of Varying Strengths and
Weaknesses Under the Different Theories of the LPLA
The LPLA provides the exclusive theories of liability when a
product causes damage. The theories of products liability enumerated
in the LPLA are: (1) unreasonably dangerous in construction or
composition; (2) unreasonably dangerous in design; (3) unreasonably
dangerous due to inadequate warning; and (4) failure to conform to an
express warranty. Under each theory, allowing evidence of
subsequent remedial measures to be considered when assessing fault
promotes weak inferences of the manufacturer's negligence or the
product's defectiveness.
170. Bienvenu, supra note 9, at 1079 ("Black's Law Dictionary defines
'culpable conduct' as synonymous with 'blameable' conduct or conduct
'involving the breach of a legal duty of the commission of a fault.' In
Louisiana, the Civil Code sets forth the basis of Louisiana's system of 'fault' in
the broadest of terms."). See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (5th ed. 1979).
171. See Bienvenu, supra note 9, at 1079. See also LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art.
2323 (2005); Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
172. Bums, supra note 34, at 1146.
173. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.55 (2005); id. § 9:2800.56; id. §
9:2800.57; id. § 9:2800.59.
174. Bums, supra note 34, at 1170.
175. Id. at 1171-72.
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i. Unreasonably Dangerous in Construction or Composition
Under the LPLA, a product is unreasonably dangerous in
construction or composition if it deviated from the manufacturer's
specifications or standards in a material way at the time the product
left the manufacturer's control. 17 6 Liability arises when a mistake in
the manufacturing process produces a substandard product.177
Therefore, the plaintiff must prove that the flaw existed at
distribution and that the flaw caused the damage.' 78 The claimant is
not required to prove knowledge on the part of the manufacturer,
which renders an analysis of what the manufacturer knew or should
have known irrelevant.' 79  Thus, under the LPLA, evidence of
subsequent remedial measures is irrelevant in establishing liability
due to a defect in construction or composition.
ii. Unreasonably Dangerous in Design
Through Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 2800.56, the
legislature created the elements for establishing that a product is
unreasonably dangerous in design. A manufacturer is liable under
this theory if, at the time the product left his control, there existed an
alternative design for the product that was capable of preventing the
damage caused. 80 Additionally, the plaintiff must prove that, at the
time of distribution, the likelihood that the product as designed
would cause the damage and the severity of the damage outweighed
both the burden of implementing the alternative design and the
possible adverse effects on utility resulting from adopting the
alternative design.18' To impose liability, the characteristic of the
product that rendered it unreasonably dangerous must exist at the
time of distribution or result from a reasonably anticipated alteration
of the product.'8 2 Therefore, evidence of post-accident repairs only
raises prejudicial inferences about the condition of the product at the
time it left the manufacturer's control, without establishing actual
knowledge on the part of the manufacturer at the time of
distribution.
176. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.55 (2005).
177. Kennedy, supra note 45, at 593.
178. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 29, at § 15.9.
179. Kennedy, supra note 45, at 594 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A cmt. a (1965)).
180. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56 (2005); Kennedy, supra note 45, at
596.
181. Kennedy, supra note 45, at 596.
182. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.54(C) (2005).
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iii. Affirmative Defenses
Through Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:2800.59, the LPLA
provides the manufacturer with state-of-the-art affirmative defenses to
rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case alleging that the product was
unreasonably dangerous in design.' 83 To present a prima facie case,
the plaintiff must establish that an alternative design existed at the
time the product left the manufacturer's control. 84  The LPLA
exculpates a manufacturer if he can prove that "in light of reasonably
available scientific and technological knowledge [he] could not have
known of the design characteristic that caused the damage or the
danger of such characteristics."' 85 The provision provides a second
affirmative defense that relieves the manufacturer of liability if he can
prove that "in light of then-existing reasonably available scientific and
technological knowledge [he] could not have known of the alternative
design identified by the claimant .. ."' 86 Finally, the third
affirmative defense allows the manufacturer to escape liability by
proving that the "alternative design identified by the claimant ... was
not feasible, in light of then-existing reasonably available scientific
and technological economic practicality."'
' 87
While evidence of subsequent remedial measures should be
excluded in products liability cases, the use of the statutorily-provided
affirmative defenses to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case should
render such evidence admissible. Use of the affirmative defenses is
analogous to the exceptions listed in the federal and Louisiana
provisions regarding "ownership, authority, knowledge, control, or
feasibility of precautionary measures,"'188 which effectively controvert
the issue. The federal Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
that "[e]xceptions must arise where defendant attempts to make
offensive use of the exclusion of [the] evidence."' 89 Similarly, in
rebutting the plaintiffs prima facie case by alleging lack of
knowledge or feasibility, the evidence of subsequent remedial
measures should be admissible, as it is when controverted under the
federal rule.
183. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 29, at § 15-10(e) (citing LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2800.59 (2005)).
184. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56(1) (2005); Maraist & Galligan, supra
note 29, at § 15-10(b).
185. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 29, at § 15-10(e) (citing LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2800.59(A)(1) (2005)).
186. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.59(A)(2) (2005)).
187. Id. (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.59(A)(3) (2005)).
188. LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 407 (2005).
189. Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980).
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iv. Unreasonably Dangerous Because of an Inadequate Warning
Finally, a product may be unreasonably dangerous because of an
inadequate warning. The LPLA dictates that liability arises under this
theory if, at the time the product left the manufacturer's control, the
product possessed a characteristic capable of causing damage and the
manufacturer did not use reasonable care in providing an adequate
warning of the characteristic and its dangers. 190  Whether the
manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger associated
with the product at the time of distribution is relevant in determining
whether he exercised reasonable care. 191 Nevertheless, the LPLA
does not mandate that the plaintiff show such knowledge.' 92 Thus,
"reasonable care" under the LPLA differs from the negligence
standard in that knowledge of the risk may be presumedi.9  The
LPLA also imposes a post-manufacture duty to warn. 19  If a
manufacturer learns of a dangerous condition in his product after
placing the product on the market, or if he should have learned of the
defect had he acted as a "reasonably prudent manufacturer," he has a
continued duty to warn of the characteristic and its danger1
95
The manufacturer, however, can escape liability by rebutting the
presumption of knowledge.' 9 6 This provision provides a requirement
of scienter, which allows the manufacturer to escape liability if he
proves that the existence of the characteristic and its danger were
unknowable at the time. 197  The element of scienter creates a
negligence standard in a failure to warn case.' 98 Similar to the use of
affirmative defenses, a defendant's use of scientific unknowability
should be treated as "controverting" the evidence, rendering the
evidence admissible.
Thus, theories of liability established by the LPLA vary in relative
strengths of associated inferences of fault; however, combining these
inferences with a strong social policy mandates exclusion of evidence
of subsequent remedial measures.1
9 9
190. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.57(a) (2005). See id. section
9:2800.53(9) for the definition of "adequate warning."
191. Kennedy, supra note 45, at 617.
192. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.57 (2005)).
193. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 29, at § 15-11.
194. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.57(C) (2005).
195. Kennedy, supra note 45, at 619 (discussing LA: REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2800.57(C) (2005)).
196. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 29, at § 15-11 (citing LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2800.59(B) (2005)).
197. Kennedy, supra note 45, at 620-21.
198. Id.
199. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note (1972).
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2. Policy Considerations
The relevancy concern in analyzing probative worth is an
important factor in excluding evidence of subsequent remedial
measures. The Louisiana Legislature, however, recognized that
the "major policy ground for this exclusion" was the social policy
of "encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them
from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety."200  Thus, the
current interpretation of article 407, as excluding products liability
from the subsequent remedial measures rule, contradicts the
universallyg-recognized social policy of encouraging evolved safety
measures. I
The distinction between negligence and products liability
becomes "hvertechnical" when analyzing policy
considerations. 2°2 Although the trier of fact may be examining the
condition of the product, in reality the suit is against the
manufacturer, not the product, and it is the manufacturer who is
responsible for implementing or delaying subsequent remedial
measures,203 presumably based on an awareness of favorable and
unfavorable effects.
A fear of negative legal repercussions arising from post-
accident remedial measures likely will cause a manufacturer to
hesitate in changing a product, regardless of the theory upon which
he ultimately is charged. 2° While proponents of the Ault rationale
deem "incentive-based arguments" to be "mere academic musings"
inapplicable to the manufacturer's decision-making process,
observers have reported evidence refuting this assertion and
confirming that manufacturers consider rules regarding subsequent
remedial measures in deciding whether to implement changes.20 5
In response to charges that it would be reckless for a manufacturer
to not implement post-accident changes, Judge Posner explained
that:
[A]ccidents are low-probability events. The probability of
another accident may be much smaller than the probability
that the victim of the accident that has already occurred will
200. 1988 La. Sess. Law Serv. 515, 1122 (West).
201. See above discussion on the general rule regarding evidence of
subsequent remedial measures established in Givens.
202. Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980).
203. Id. ("From a defendant's point of view it is the fact that the evidence
may be used against him which will inhibit subsequent repairs or improvement.
It makes no difference to the defendant on what theory the evidence is admitted;
his inclination to make subsequent improvements will be similarly repressed.").
204. Rabalais, supra note 9, at 990.
205. See, e.g., Carver, supra note 36, at 595-96.
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sue the injurer and, if permitted, will make devastating use
at trial of any measures that the injurer may have taken
since the accident to reduce the danger.
20 6
He deemed the deterrent effect equally likely, regardless of
whether the underlying theory of liability was negligence or
product liability.
20 7
Excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures promotes
innovation by eliminating inferential guilt from these activities.
2 0 8
For example, when analyzing the costs and benefits of a given
innovation, the balance often considers the threat of litigation and
greater vulnerability of liability associated with the proposed
innovation. 20 9 These concerns undoubtedly stifle a manufacturer's
drive to improve and innovate.
210
C. Jury Confusion Is an Important Side Effect of Admitting
Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures
Related to the policy and relevancy concerns is the fear that
encouraging weak inferences in assessing liability promotes jury
confusion. It has been recognized that a jury could perceive
evidence of remedial changes as an admission of legal fault,
understandablx discouraging a manufacturer from implementing
such repairs.2 Critics warn that although evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is not probative of a product's characterization
as unreasonably dangerous, it "may become so in the eyes of juries
incapable of limiting the evidence to its proper use. 21 2 Judge
Posner recognized this possibility, which reinforced his conviction
that policy concerns are applicable to a manufacturer, regardless of
whether the suit is predicated on negligence or products liability.
213
He explained, "[i]t is only because juries are believed to overreact
to evidence of subsequent remedial measures that the admissibility
of such evidence could deter defendants from taking such
measures."
214
206. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463,469 (7th Cir. 1984).
207. Id.
208. Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra note 12, at 509.
209. Id. at 510.
210. Id.
211. Kimball, supra note 138, at 1419 (citing Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658
F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981)).
212. Id. at 1429.
213. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1984).
214. Id.
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D. The Substantive Differences Between Federal Rule 407 and
Louisiana Article 407 Encourage Forum Shopping.
Finally, the Toups interpretation of Louisiana Code of Evidence
article 407 encourages forum shopping by plaintiffs asserting a cause
of action under products liability.7 5 Louisiana manufacturers will
remove cases to federal court when possible to avoid the harsh
evidentiary rules that Toups imposes. Similarly, plaintiffs will
employ strategies to avoid diversity of citizenship in order to litigate
the issue in state court under the insulation of the Toups rule.216 Even
though both courts will be applying the substantive law of the LPLA,
the evidentiary rules will work differently under the current regime
since the 401/403 balance affords discretion to the trial judge, while
Rule 407 employs per se rules of non-admissibility. " Forum
shopping undermines the fairness and efficiency of the Louisiana
judicial process. 218 By modeling Louisiana's interpretation of the
subsequent remedial measures rule on the federal rule, the threat of
forum shopping can be eliminated.
Thus, the current state of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 407
calls for revitalization. The federal position undoubtedly presents an
evidentiary standard equally as necessary in Louisiana as it is at the
federal level and in numerous other states. The legislature has already
performed a balancing of values and determined that the detrimental
effects of including evidence of substantive remedial measures
"substantially outweighs" any probative value such evidence may
have. This balance is applicable when the evidence is used in a
products liability case as well. Thus, application of the 401/403
balance is neither necessary nor appropriate. Moreover, including
products liability within the ranks of "negligence or culpable
conduct" is consistent with the liability regime imposed by the LPLA.
Strong social policy mandating exclusion combined with weak
inferences of guilt arising from the evidence further dictate that such
evidence should be excluded. Finally, evidence of subsequent
remedial measures inspires juror confusion and encourages forum
shopping. Therefore, once reexamined, Louisiana should amend its
position and exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures in
products liability cases. However, should the manufacturer utilize
one of the affirmative defenses provided by the LPLA, the evidence
will be admissible, thereby preserving the areas in which the
legislature deemed the probative worth sufficient to merit inclusion.
215. Bienvenu, supra note 9, at 1082.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1082-83.
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V. CONCLUSION
The exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures is a
universally accepted doctrine when applied to negligence and
culpable conduct. In the last decade, the federal circuits collectively
convinced Congress to amend Federal Rule of Evidence 407 to
include products liability within the scope of the general subsequent
remedial measures rule. In doing so, Congress explicitly recognized
that the policy concerns facing a manufacturer necessitate protection
under the rule. Louisiana, however, has not similarly amended its
position, although the comments and courts expressly cited the
federal rule as the model upon which Louisiana Code of Evidence
article 407 was originally fashioned.
Instead, Louisiana continues to allow evidence of post-accident
changes to be admitted as evidence when the theory of culpability is
products liability, despite the fact that the case cementing this
interpretation has been attacked by numerous writers. Article 407
must be revisited, and, upon reevaluation, Louisiana must adopt the
federal position. The need to encourage manufacturers to
continually improve their products necessitates exclusion of such
evidence, as does the understanding that evidence of subsequent
changes is irrelevant in proving liability under the LPLA. The
concerns motivating the exceptions to per se exclusion can be
adequately protected by admitting evidence of subsequent remedial
measures when the manufacturer attempts to escape liability through
an affirmative defense. Should the Louisiana Supreme Court
reverse the Toups decision as this comment urges, an amendment to
article 407 will not be necessary, as products liability arguably falls
under the ambit of "culpable conduct" as provided for by the article.
Regardless of the means of repairing the subsequent remedial
measures problem, Louisiana must alter its antiquated position or
risk impeding progress.
Erin G. Lutkewitte*
* I would like to thank Professor Frank L. Maraist for his invaluable
assistance and insight in developing this topic. I would also like to dedicate this
comment to my friend and fellow law student Joseph Ryan LoProto (1980-
2005).
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